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Introduction  
 
This paper discusses the role that soft law can play in (1) understanding debt 
management in the context of debt sustainability assessments; (2) enabling least 
developed countries to deal with debt vulnerabilities, (3) creating greater predictability 
in the context of debt restructuring and, generally (4) facilitating compliance and 
observance of international standards that do not create legal obligations.  
 
It argues that UNCTAD can play a central role in the adoption and implementation of soft 
law principles to promote responsible sovereign lending and borrowing, working 
together with other international organisations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, as 
well as regional development banks, national Debt Management Offices and central 
banks. One can envisage a level of convergence in the area of sovereign debt similar to 
the convergence achieved by central banks in the area of capital regulation through the 
adoption of the soft law standards issued by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. 
 
Debt sustainability is one of the main priorities of the Intergovernmental Group of 
Experts on Financing for Development. Its focus, as pointed out in the Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda (AAAA), is to assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt 
sustainability “through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt 
relief, debt restructuring and sound debt management, as appropriate” (paragraph 94).   
 
While better data availability, quality of data and debt transparency are certainly 
needed, this paper contends that we should promote the role of soft law as an ‘equalizer’ 
in the negotiations between creditors and debtors, enabling and enhancing the legal 
capacity of emerging economices. . In the absence of an international convention that 
deals with sovereign debt matters, soft law fills the vacuum. In particular, the UNCTAD 
Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing2  can play a 
significant function with regard to the objective of debt sustainability and the 
effectiveness of sovereign debt restructurings.  
 
The UNCTAD principles should be complemented and further implemented by specific 
technical legal standards (a ‘manual’) on how to negotiate sovereign debt instruments 
                                                        
2  UNCTAD, ‘Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing’, 10 January 
2012, available at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2012misc1_en.pdf. 
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and how to carry out debt restructuring.  A deep level of specificity could make less 
relevant the disparity of skills, resources and technical knowledge between creditors 
and debtors and their legal advisers.  
 
The paper is divided into eight sections, following this introduction. Section 1 reviews 
the nature of soft law and the institutions that create financial soft law. Section 2 
considers the taxonomy of soft law and the pros and cons of relying upon soft law. 
Section 3 surveys the implementation and transformation of soft law into hard law and 
the incentives to promote observance of soft law. Section 4 deals with the resolution of 
sovereign debt problems. Section 5 examines the role of the UNCTAD principles. Section 
6 looks at the role of Debt Management Offices (DMOs). Section 7 analyses debt 
sustainability assessments (DSAs) from the perspective of predictability and uniformity 
in treatment. Section 8 concludes. 
 
1. Nature of soft law and sources of international financial soft law 
 
Soft law has been defined as rules that are not legally binding but which in practice are 
adhered to by those to whom they are addressed, or by those who subscribe to them for 
a variety of reasons, such as moral suasion, fear of adverse action, and other incentives.3 
It thus comprises ‘a variety of non-legally binding instruments used in contemporary 
international relations’.4  
 
A key feature of soft law is its informality. Informality distinguishes soft law from hard 
law.5   As regards the origins of soft law some argue that its ancestors can be found in 
the medieval lex mercatoria,  i.e. the mercantile codes and customs which reflected the 
usages of trade, the maritime and commercial practice at the time, whilst others think 
that they stem from ‘the early 20th century theories of social law and legal pluralism’.6  
 
Soft law should be regarded as law and, in the area of international financial law, it has 
become the most frequently adopted form of law. 7   This is because of the inherent 
difficulties involved in treaty (hard law) making in the field of finance.  Accordingly, soft 
law has played a very significant function in filling this vacuum8 and in coordinating the 
                                                        
3 Roy Goode, ‘Commercial Law’, 2nd edn (London: Penguin Books, 1995) 20-1. 
4 Alan Boyle, ‘Soft law in international law-making’, in Malcom D. Evans (ed.), International law, 2nd 
edn (Oxford, OUP, 2006) 142.  See also Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law, (Oxford: 
OUP, 2007) 212. 
5 Rosa M. Lastra, ‘International financial and monetary law’, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2015) 502. 
6 Anna Di Robilant, ‘Genealogies of soft law’, (2006) 54 The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
499. 
7 Chris Brummer, ‘Soft law and the global financial system’, 2nd edn (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) 120. 
8 Rosa M. Lastra, supra, 503. 
  
 4 
regulatory process.9 Though soft law rules do not create legal obligations, nonetheless 
they have legal effects. 
 
With regard to the institutions that create international financial soft law, there are 
many entities, bodies and groupings involved in the process including the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), development banks such as the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the G7, G10 and G20, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO), the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), and others. 
 
Amongst the standard setters, there are intergovernmental entities whose rules have a 
‘top-down’ nature,10 and there are professional associations or market entities whose 
rules have a ‘bottom-up’ character such as ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association) and other forms of self-regulation.11 
 
The presence of a significant number of standard-setters involved in various ways in the 
adoption of general principles, guidelines and best practices poses a problem of 
coordination and risks inconsistency amongst the various rules and ‘rulers’. To tackle 
these issues, the G20 leaders at the London Summit in 2009 committed themselves ‘to 
establish much greater consistency and systematic cooperation between countries, and 
the framework of internationally agreed high standards, that a global financial system 
requires’12 and the Financial Stability Board has a key role in this regard (including the 
publication of the Compendium of Standards). 
 
2. The taxonomy of soft law and the pros and cons of soft law 
 
There are different types of soft law rules according to: 1) their effect, 2) their scope, 3) 
their degree of specificity, 4) their source and nature, 5) their contents. 
 
                                                        
9 Chris Brummer, supra, 5. 
10  Particularly relevant in the field of sovereign debt are: UNCTAD, ‘Principles on Promoting 
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing’, 10 January 2012, available at 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2012misc1_en.pdf; G20, ‘Operational Guidelines 
for Sustainable Financing’, March 2017; United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 69/319’ on 10 
September 2015, available at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/804641/files/A_RES_69_319-
EN.pdf. 
11 Rosa M. Lastra, supra, 504. 
12 G20, ‘London Summit-Leaders’ Statement’ (2 April 2009). 
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In terms of their effect, soft law rules can vary from simple professional practices (such 
as best practices or gentlemen agreements) to uniform rules, codes and guidelines.13  
There is a hierarchy in soft law akin to the hierarchy in hard law, ranging from 
constitutional principles (primary law) to specific technical rules (secondary law). 
 
With regard to their scope, it is possible to distinguish between sectoral standards (for 
instance, banking, securities and insurance standards) and functional standards (for 
instance, disclosure, governance, accounting standards, etc). 
 
In relation to their degree of specificity, an interesting example is the distinction drawn 
by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 14  among principles, practices and 
methodologies/guidelines, where the first ones give flexibility in the implementation, 
the second ones are more detailed and therefore offer less flexibility and the third ones 
provide either specific guidance or precise requirements thereby offering very little 
flexibility. From a practical perspective, their different level of specificity determines 
that national authorities will have more or less discretion in implementing them in their 
domestic jurisdictions. 
 
Concerning their source, as mentioned above, there are ‘top-down’ rules adopted by 
official entities and ‘bottom-up’ rules usually emanated by market associations in the 
form of self-regulation. 
 
From the point of view of their contents, there are substantive rules and rules that 
allocate regulatory jurisdiction.15   
 
According to Brummer, soft law instruments can be grouped into three categories: 1) 
best practices, 2) regulatory reports and observations, and 3) information sharing and 
enforcement cooperation agreements. 16  Best practices aim at promoting ‘sound 
regulatory supervision’. 17   They concern areas, such as ‘capital adequacy, optimal 
disclosure rules, or due diligence techniques for preventing money laundering and 
terrorist financing. These practices may be promulgated by coalitions of wealthy 
regional bodies or even by organizations of private actors blessed by national 
authorities’.18 Differently, ‘reports create an official record of fact drawn on by financial 
                                                        
13 Rosa M. Lastra, supra, 511. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 511-512. 
16 Chris Brummer, supra, 121. 
17 Id., 121. 
18 Id., 121. 
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authorities to regulate and supervise markets’.19 Sometimes, such records only collect 
data; other times, ‘they record official opinions and institutional perspectives’ 
concerning both financial data and their implications for the global economy. 20  
Information-sharing agreements are international agreements that ‘spell out the 
procedural means by which greater information sharing and enforcement cooperation 
can be achieved’.21 Usually they are promulgated through memoranda of understanding. 
‘National regulators of the banking and securities industries routinely enter into these 
agreements whereby the regulators commit to better coordination with one another in 
order to enhance their prudential oversight and monitoring at home’.22 
 
Brummer notes that ‘while the legal effect of these different soft law instruments is not 
necessarily the same, it is characteristic of all of them that they are carefully negotiated, 
and often carefully drafted statements, which are in some cases intended to have some 
normative significance despite their non-binding, non-treaty form. There is at least an 
element of good faith commitment, and in many cases, a desire to influence state practice 
and an element of law-making intention and progressive development. In this sense non-
binding soft law instruments are not fundamentally different from those multilateral 
treaties which serve much the same law-making purposes. In this respect they may be 
both an alternative to and a part of the process of multilateral treaty-making’.23 
 
The main advantages of soft law are its flexibility, dynamism, informality and 
pragmatism.24 Soft law rules are also characterised by a high level of sophistication and 
technical detail. The modus operandi of many ‘international standard-setters’ (the 
technical expertise of those involved, the commonality of knowledge and interests, and 
the relatively small size of the working groups) fosters pragmatism and mutual trust. In 
contrast, international treaty making (hard law) is a lengthy, slow, rigid and, at times 
politically motivated process. While this formality provides legitimacy and 
accountability (important considerations in a democratic system), it also leads to a 
rather ‘static output’ since once a treaty is agreed and adopted, it is complicated to 
amend since it requires - by unanimity or qualified majority - the consensus of the 
signatory States. 
 
                                                        
19 Id., 122. 
20 Id., 122. 
21 Id., 123. 
22 Id., 123. 
23 Alan Boyle, ‘Some reflections on the relationship of treaties and soft law’, (1999) 48, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 902. 
24 Mario Giovanoli, ‘A new architecture for the global financial markets: legal aspects of international 
financial standard setting’, in Mario Giovanoli (ed), International Monetary Law. Issues for the New 
Millenium, (Oxford, OUP, 2000), 39. 
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The main drawbacks of soft law relate to its non-binding character and concerns about 
legitimacy and accountability. As regards the latter, of particular relevance is the country 
‘ownership’ problem given the under-representation of developing countries within the 
international standard-setting bodies. This under-inclusiveness together with the level 
of sophistication of some standards may provide a challenge in the pursuit of regulatory 
convergence. 25  The proliferation of standards may also lead to complexity, 
inconsistency, overlaps or gaps. Over time the number of entities and bodies adopting 
soft law rules has significantly increased.26 
 
In the area of financial law, one of the most relevant standard-setters is the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Despite the lack of direct legal binding force 
of the BCBS standards, it has become a de facto international regulatory body.27  Many 
argue that the informality and independence of the Committee have served well in the 
design of international banking rules, as it has acted with a fair degree of depoliticization 
and a considerable amount of technical expertise and competence in banking and 
monetary affairs.28 
 
3. The implementation of soft law and its transformation into hard law 
 
The evolution of law provides evidence of the formalization of rules over time. Many 
legal rules that are today binding were at some point customs, usages, or practices. Since 
financial law and, in particular, international financial law is a rather novel field of law, 
its dynamic and evolving character is unsurprising. 
Formal law has often been born out of the development of informal law. This is not a 
new phenomenon; it is a recurrent feature in the history of law. The relation between 
soft law and legally binding rules often appears to be an evolutionary process. The 
evolution of international law and of commercial law, to cite two relevant examples, 
provides clear evidence in this regard.29 
 
We referred above to the lex mercatoria, when talking about the origins of soft law.  Many 
of the uncodified usages of trade, the maritime and commercial practice eventually 
became formal law.  The primary sources of international law are conventional law 
                                                        
25 Rosa M. Lastra, supra, 513-514. 
26 Id., 513. 
27 Since January 2013 it has its own ‘charter’ available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm. As 
stated in the Charter, the internal organisational structure of the BCBS comprises: (a) The Committee; 
(b) Groups, working groups and task forces;  (c) the Chairman; (d) The Secretariat. The Committee’s 
Secretariat is provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel. 
28 Rosa M. Lastra, supra, 506. 
29 Id., 521. 
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(treaty law), customary law and the general principles of the law, as recognised by 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Customary international 
law, however, can evolve into conventional law. Indeed, important principles of 
customary international law have became codified in the Vienna Convention of the Law 
of the Treaties, thus acquiring the characteristic of ‘conventional law’. 
 
After the adoption of soft law rules, their implementation is typically done at national 
level with the domestic legislature passing a law or the regulator issuing specific 
regulation. It is due to such a formal legislative or regulatory act that the soft law rules 
become hard law rules thereby binding and enforceable at national level. 
 
The hard law rules capability of being binding and enforceable is what mainly 
distinguishes them from soft law rules, that are not coercive, being mainly an ‘expression 
of cooperation’.30 The strength of the latter, indeed, only derives from the willingness of 
the involved parties to comply with them. Such a willingness sometimes can be 
stimulated by regulatory competition, in the sense that national jurisdictions might want 
to have in place the latest internationally adopted soft-law rules to make themselves a 
safe legal environment in which global financial players are comfortable to do business.  
 
Concerning the relationship between soft law and hard law, it is worth noting that 
sometimes the former complements or supplements the latter. For instance, in the 
context of the law of the IMF, a number of international guidelines, recommendations, 
codes of conduct, standards, and policies have been developed to interpret, supplement, 
or implement the Articles of Agreement.31 
It has been argued that while lawyers express a preference for hard law (legally binding, 
legitimate, and enforceable treaties), economists acknowledge the advantages of soft 
law rules (speed, flexibility, and pragmatism).32 
 
There are incentives to promote observance of soft law rules. Indeed, in the absence of 
formal enforcement mechanisms, ‘incentives’ compel those to whom they are 
                                                        
30 Chris Brummer, supra, 132. 
31  See Joseph Gold, ‘Interpretation: The IMF and International Law’ (London, the Hague, Boston: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996), 299–401. See also Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft 
International Law of Exchange Arrangements, (1983) 77, American Journal of International Law, 443. 
32 See Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa and Fabrizio Saccomanni, ‘Managing a Market-Led Global Financial 
System’ in Petter K Kenen (ed), Managing the World Economy Fifty Years After Bretton Woods 
(Washington DC: Institute of International Economics, 1994) 266. 
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addressed to observe the rules.33 These incentives function as a substitute for formal 
enforcement mechanisms.34 
 
The official sector has developed a number of policies and measures to promote 
observance of soft law rules. For example, the ‘name and shame’ practice associated with 
the list prepared by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) 
regarding non-cooperating jurisdictions35 or the OECD list of offshore financial centres 
responsible for harmful tax competition36 act as deterrents against ‘non observance’. 
Institutionalized peer review is another official incentive to promote observance, often 
as a complement to financial sector surveillance. In 2010, the FSB launched a regular 
programme of peer reviews comprising: thematic reviews and country reviews. These 
reviews are focused on the implementation and effectiveness of international financial 
standards developed by standard-setting bodies (SSBs) and of policies agreed within the 
FSB. The FSB's Standing Committee on Standards Implementation (SCSI) oversees the 
functioning of the peer review programme that is mandatory for its members (Article 
6.1 of the FSB Charter).37 
 
The use of IMF conditionality acts as a very powerful official incentive as well, when 
the country’s adherence to a particular set of standards is made a ‘condition’ for the 
disbursement of IMF funds under a standby or extended arrangement.38 
 
The G-20 supports and encourages the ‘official incentives’ and at the G20 Pittsburgh 
Summit in 2009, the Leaders confirmed their commitment to take action with a 
consistent implementation of the global standards both nationally and internationally.39 
In addition to official incentives, there are various instruments of market discipline, such 
as credit risk weightings, private ratings, borrowing spreads, differentiated interest 
                                                        
33 Though the word ‘compliance’ is a term typically used in the case of hard law and ‘observance’ (or 
adherence to) in the case of soft law, sometimes the word compliance is also used in references to 
soft law. 
34 Rosa M. Lastra, supra, 516. 
35  See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, ‘Non-Cooperative Countries and 
Territories’ (Paris: OECD Financial Action Task Force, 2004), at <http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/ 
NCCT_en.htm#List>. 
36 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, ‘List of Uncooperative Tax Havens’ 
at <http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,2340,en_2649_33745_30578809_1_ 
1_1_37427,00.html>. 
37 The objectives and guidelines for the conduct of FSB peer reviews are included in the ‘Handbook 
for FSB Peer Reviews’, available at 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_140106.pdf> and for more information 
see, <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/activities/peer_reviews.htm>.   
38 Rosa M. Lastra, supra, 517. 
39  G20 Leaders’ Statement, Pittsburgh Summit, September 2009, available at 
<http://www.g20.org/documents/final-communique.pdf>. 
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rates, inter-bank exposure, and others that act as incentives to adhere to soft law rules.40 
These forms of market discipline are typically voluntary and require a developed 
framework of transparency or disclosure. 
 
International investors often require that developing countries adopt the best available 
standards of best practice. This adoption enhances their credit standing and improves 
the attractiveness and reputation of their financial systems in the international 
marketplace. 
 
The success of standardized clauses and model rules in private contracts developed by 
trade and financial industry associations (such as ISDA) 41  has demonstrated that 
markets are capable of spreading existing standards across jurisdictions and developing 
common rules (self-regulation). 
 
An indirect incentive for countries to comply with soft law rules is the monitoring 
process carried out mostly by the main standard-setters themselves.  The IMF and the 
World Bank have developed a framework for assessing member countries’ observance 
of standards and codes (the ‘Standards and Codes Initiative’), working in cooperation 
with national authorities, standard-setting agencies, and other international bodies.42 
The standards relate to data and policy transparency, financial sector regulation and 
supervision, and market integrity.43 Assessments of the degree of implementation of 
these standards by countries result in the Reports on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSCs), which are discussed below. 
 
The Basel Committee is also committed to monitor its members' compliance with the 
globally agreed minimum standards. Hence, a regulatory consistency assessment 
programme (RCAP) was launched in April 2012 with the aim to promote full and 
consistent implementation of Basel III. The assessment programme is conducted on 
                                                        
40 See Giovanoli, supra, 48. 
41 See generally <http://www.isda.org>. 
42 See generally International Monetary Fund, ‘Standards and Codes: The Role of the IMF - Factsheet’, 
(Washington DC: IMF, 2014), at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sc.htm>. The 
standards and codes initiative was launched in 1999 as a prominent component of efforts to 
strengthen the international financial architecture. The initiative was designed to promote greater 
financial stability through the development, dissemination, adoption, and implementation of 
international standards and codes. The initiative covers 12 standards which the Bank and Fund 
Boards recognized as relevant for their work with regard to policy transparency, financial sector 
regulation and supervision, and market integrity. Assessments of the degree of implementation of 
these standards by countries result in the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSCs). 
43 See International Monetary Fund, ‘IMF Executive Board Concludes Review of Standards and Codes 
Initiative’, Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 11/38, March 22, 2011, available at 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2011/pn1138.htm>. 
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three levels: level 1, ensuring the timely adoption of Basel III; level 2, 
ensuring regulatory consistency with Basel III and level 3, ensuring consistency 
of outcomes.44  
 
The Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) provides in-depth 
examinations of countries’ financial sectors and constitutes a powerful official incentive 
to promote the observance of soft law rules.  FSAPs are done jointly by World Bank and 
IMF staff in developing and emerging market countries (IBRD countries) and by the IMF 
alone in advanced economies. FSAPs have two main components: the financial stability 
assessment and—in developing and emerging market countries—the financial 
development assessment. These components may be assessed at the same time during 
a joint IMF-World Bank mission or at different times in separate stability and 
development “modules” conducted by the Fund and the Bank, respectively.45 
 
The FSAP helps identify financial system vulnerabilities and develop appropriate policy 
responses and provides countries with an opportunity to measure their compliance with 
financial sector standards and codes and, therefore, to benchmark their regulatory and 
supervisory systems against internationally-accepted practices.46 
  
The Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), which are a key 
component of the FSAP, summarize the extent to which countries observe relevant 
internationally recognized standards and codes and are prepared and published at the 
request of the member country.47 Participation by countries in standard assessment and 
                                                        
44 See, Basel Committee, ‘Basel III Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme’ (April 2012), at 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs216.htm>. 
45  See International Monetary Fund, ‘Financial Sector Assessment Program: Frequently Asked 
Questions’, available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/faq/index.htmMarch 2013> and 
‘Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) - Factsheet’ available at <http:// 
www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fsap.asp>.  
46  See The World Bank, ‘Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)’ available at 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/0,,contentMDK
:22142161~menuPK:6459396~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:282885,00.html>. An 
FSAP report is prepared at the request of a member country by the staff of the Bank and the Fund.  
An FSAP report consists of three volumes. The first volume (Main Report) is an overall assessment 
of the member’s financial sector. It is confidential and made available only to the country’s competent 
authorities. The second volume (Selected Financial Sector Issues) is a detailed technical analysis, 
which is also confidential. These first two volumes are not published by the member, the Fund, or the 
Bank. The third volume of the FSAP report (Assessment of Observance of International Standards 
and Codes) contains a detailed assessment of the observance of selected financial sector standards, 
codes, and good practices. The authorities may publish these detailed assessments but only with the 
consent of the Bank and the Fund. See François Gianviti, ‘Legal Aspects of the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program’, paper presented at the IMF Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary 
and Financial Law in May 2002, available at 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002cdmfl/eng/gianv2.pdf>. 
47 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp>. 
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ROSC publication are voluntary. The IMF has recognized twelve areas and associated 
standards as useful for the operational work of the Fund and the World Bank. These 
comprise accounting; auditing; anti-money laundering and countering the financing of 
terrorism (AML/CFT); banking supervision; corporate governance; data dissemination; 
fiscal transparency; insolvency and creditor rights; insurance supervision; monetary 
and financial policy transparency; payments systems; and securities regulation. They 
are used to help sharpen the institutions’ policy discussions with national authorities, 
and in the private sector for risk assessment (by rating agencies and others). One could 
add the UNCTAD principles to the is set of standards assessed under the ROSCs.  The 
‘good practices’ identified through ROSCs can, in turn, generate more standards and 
codes 
 
4. The resolution of sovereign debt problems 
 
Over the last years the relationship between soft law and sovereign finance has become 
increasingly debated at the international level.48  Reliance on soft law is one of several 
policy options that have been proposed to deal with the absence of a transnational 
sovereign bankruptcy regime or code concerning sovereign debt problems/crises, one 
that could permit sovereign borrowers to obtain debt relief when their financial 
obligations outstrip their ability to pay without worrying about hostile creditor action.  
 
In this paper we argue that UNCTAD should have a central role in achieving normative 
convergence in the field of sovereign finance. But before discussing the role of the 
UNCTAD principles (soft law) we should review alternative and complementary 
proposals or policy options to deal with the ad hoc and fragmented nature of the 
resolution of sovereign debt problems.49  These policy options range from statutory 
solutions to voluntary contractual solutions.  
 
                                                        
48 Debt relief was advocated by Benjamin Friedman in a talk given in front of a number of Central 
Bankers in Lucerna – Switzerland; see Gillian Tett, ‘A debt to history?’, FT.COM/MAGAZINE, January 
17/18 2018, stating that Friedman explicitly ‘pointed out that one of the great beneficiaries of debt 
forgiveness throughout the last century was Germany: on multiple occasions (1924, 1929, 1932 and 
1953), the western allies had restructured German debt. So why couldn’t Germany do the same for 
others? There is ample precedent within Europe for both debt relief and debt restructuring… 
There is no economic ground for Germany to be the only European country in modern times to be 
granted official debt relief on a massive scale and certainly no moral ground either’.    
49  See generally Rosa Lastra and Lee Buchheit, ‘Sovereign Debt Management’ (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014), which extensively deals with all these issues. See also the Report presented 
by the Sovereign Insolvency Study Group – chaired by Philip Wood – to the ILA Hague Conference 
(August, 2010) on ‘State Insolvency: options for the way forward’ (co-rapportuers: Michael Waibel 
and Brian Hunt).  
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The ‘statutory solution’ to the problem of orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises 
refers to the possible adoption of what has been referred to as the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism or SDRM, with the IMF playing a central role.  The adoption of 
the SDRM would in principle imply an amendment to the IMF  Articles of Agreement. 
The creation at an international level of a bankruptcy procedure for countries, akin to 
Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy code, and of an independent dispute resolution forum 
to verify claims, has been hailed in some official and academic circles as an improvement 
over the current piecemeal approach to the resolution of international debt crises, which 
involves a variety of actors, including international organizations (notably the IMF), 
informal clubs (the Paris Club for official debt, the London Club for commercial bank 
debt), national authorities, and private financial institutions. 50  
 
Advocates of the SDRM have claimed that it would fill a gap in the international financial 
system by providing a framework to help resolve the problems of collective action and 
creditor coordination and to encourage a country with unsustainable debt and its 
creditors to restructure before it gets to the point where default is the only option. The 
IMF started considering the SDRM in 2001, 51  though Jeffrey Sachs 52  anticipated the 
concept in 1995 and the idea of an international bankruptcy procedure was also 
discussed in the 1980s.53 The SDRM was first proposed by Anne Krueger (under the 
                                                        
50  See Anne Krueger, ‘International Financial Architecture for 2002:  A New Approach to Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring’, (November 26, 2001), at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm; see generally, Sean Hagan, 
‘Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt’, (2005) 36, Georgetown J. Int’l Law, 
299. See Enrique Cosìo-Pascal, ‘Paris Club’, in Barry Herman, Josè Antonio Ocampo and Shari Spiegel 
(eds), Overcoming Developing Country Debt Crises (Oxford University Press 2010) 231, where it is 
underlined that debtor countries express genuine concern about the effectiveness and lack of 
impartiality of the ‘Paris Club’, the heavy cost in terms of the time consumed in individual 
negotiations with many creditors, and the fact that creditors can also apply pressure in bilateral 
rescheduling. Others have suggested the resort to arbitration or to a dispute resolution mechanism 
akin to the WTO dispute settlement system. 
51  See Anne Krueger, supra. See IMF fact-sheet, ‘Proposals for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism’, January 2003 at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdrm.htm>. 
52 See Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?’, Frank D Graham Lecture, 
Princeton University, 1995, at <http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/about/director/ 
pubs/intllr.pdf>. Sachs argues that international bankruptcy procedures modelled upon Chapter 9 
and Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code would be the best response to cope with crises of the 
Mexican type. Sachs’s proposals included the reorganization of the IMF to act as a kind of 
international bankruptcy court rather than as a lender of last resort to member governments. Sachs 
emphasized the need to prevent a ‘grab race’ by creditors and the need to prevent a small number of 
dissident creditors from blocking an agreement acceptable to the vast majority of creditors. See also 
Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes, ‘Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workout for Sovereign Debtors’ 
(London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995), and Peter Kenen (ed), ‘From Halifax to Lyons: 
What has been done about crises management?’ Essays in International Finance No 200, Princeton 
University, October 1996. 
53 See eg Benjamin Cohen, ‘A Global Chapter 11’, (1989) 75, Foreign Policy, 109. 
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auspices of the IMF) and went through several modifications.54 However, enthusiasm for 
the SDRM waned for over a decade after 2003 and reliance on market solutions 
(contractual mechanisms) became the preferred approach.  
 
Political opposition in the US and resistance on the side of many market participants 
contributed to the loss of momentum. Enthusiasm for some form of SDRM (possibly one 
at the European level) has been reignited in the light of the Argentine litigation and the 
eurozone woes.55  
 
An alternative and much more modest proposal could be a creative interpretation of 
Article VIII, section 2(a), of the IMF Articles of Agreement, which has been proposed for 
example by Lee Buchheit and Jeremy Pam. Article VIII section 2(a) reads as follows: 
‘Subject to [conditions not relevant here], no member shall, without the approval of the 
Fund, impose restrictions on the payment of payments and transfers for current 
international transactions’. It could be amended to either affect creditor rights 
(rendering unenforceable in the territories of any IMF member country a debt 
instrument that was invited to participate in a Sovereign Debt Adjustment program but 
declined to do so) or creditor remedies (immunizing in all IMF member countries the 
assets and revenue streams of the debtor country against which attachment by the 
holder of a debt instrument that was invited to participate in a Fund approved Sovereign 
Debt Adjustment Programme but declined to do so).56 
 
The contractual (voluntary) solution, namely the reliance on contractual techniques, is 
the approach that has been favoured in recent years to confront the problems of 
sovereign debt workouts and in particular the hold-out problem. In 1996, a G10 Working 
Group issued a report (known as the Rey Report, after its Chairman, Jean-Jacques Rey of 
Belgium) recommending inter alia the inclusion of Collective Action Clauses in sovereign 
                                                        
54 Anne Krueger, ‘New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking’, 
Conference on ‘Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards’, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC, 1 April 2002, at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/ speeches/2002/040102.htm>. 
On 24 March 2003, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) continued its 
discussions on the possible features of a new Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) 
based on the staff paper ‘Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism’. See PIN 
No 03/45, 3 April 2003, ‘IMF Board discusses possible features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism’ at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2003/ pn0345.htm>. 
55 See Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, ‘Statutory Sovereign Debt Resolution Mechanisms’ in Rosa M Lastra 
and Lee Buchheit (eds), Sovereign Debt Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 333-
358.   
56 Article VIII Section 2(b) of the IMF Articles of Agreement declares ‘unenforceable in the territories of 
any member’ certain types of contracts that are inconsistent with Fund-approved exchange control 
regulations. See aLee C Buchheit and Jeremiah S Pam, 'The Pari Passu Clause in. Sovereign Debt 
Instruments' (2004) 53 Emory L.J. 869, 871. 
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bonds and greater reliance on market discipline, following the Mexican ‘bailout’.57 The 
US Government, the G7, the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF, 
and others supported this solution, which also enjoyed considerable academic support.  
 
Collective Action Clauses (CACs) are provisions contained in bonds that allow the 
holders of a specified majority (seventy-five per cent) to amend the terms (payment and 
non-payment terms) of the bonds and make them binding on the minority.58 CACs thus 
allow the debtor to restructure its debt by a resolution of a binding majority of 
bondholders. CACs thus permit a form of contractual ‘cram-down’ of changes to payment 
terms on dissenting minorities. This practice has become the norm worldwide and in the 
Euroarea it is now mandated by the ESM Treaty (Article 12, paragraph 3) for new 
issuances of bonds on or after January 1st, 2013.  
 
Some advocate the use of State-contingent debt instruments to deal with sovereign debt 
problems. These financial instruments link the ‘payoffs to a State variable (such as GDP, 
inflation or commodity prices) or to a trigger event (such as a natural disaster or a health 
epidemic)’. It is argued that they can ‘reduce the likelihood of costly debt restructurings 
by providing an automatic mechanism of adjustment. Despite these potential benefits, 
adoption so far has been limited to few instances involving catastrophe bonds and 
climate change bonds’. 59  
 
What is interesting about CACs and other contractual techniques used in sovereign bond 
documentation is that they are increasingly becoming ‘standard’, a kind of new lex 
mercatoria in this field (creation of law ex novo). Indeed the way forward in terms of 
solft law and sovereign fiannce relies upon a combination of these ‘bottom up’ 
standardised contractual clauses with ‘top-down’ rules issued by intergovernmental 
entities such as the UNCTAD principles. 
 
5. The role of the UNCTAD principles on responsible sovereign lending and 
borrowing 
 
                                                        
57 See <http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.htm>. There was another G10 Report on CACs published in 
September 2002. 
58  See Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, ‘The wonder-clause’ (2013) 41 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 2, 367; Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati and Eric A. Posner, ‘The Evolution of Contractual Terms 
in Sovereign Bonds’ (2012) 4 Journal of Legal Analysis 1, 141-42; Philip R Wood, ‘Sovereign state 
restructuring and credit default swaps’ (2011) 26 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 
11, 661. 
59  UNCTAD, ‘Financing for development: debt and debt sustainability and interrelated systemic 
issues’, Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat, 5 October 2018, 12. 
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The UNCTAD Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing60 
together with the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing, 61  and the 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 69/319, on 10 September 2015 62 
constitute an important step in the pursuit of debt sustainability and interrelated 
systemic issues via soft-law making. 
 
These soft law rules seek to develop a set of behavioural standards that both lenders and 
borrowers should comply with in order to reduce the likelihood of a sovereign debt 
crisis. A broad consensus on these principles might help create a regulatory convergence 
at the national level and international level, that in turn could eventually end up 
favouring the adoption of hard law rules.63  
 
The effectiveness of the UNCTAD principles could be enhanced through a variety of 
mechanisms and incentives, ranging from the ones mentioned above with regard to the 
IMF functions of conditional financial assistance and surveillance (in general and with 
regard to the FSAP/ROSCs), as well as peer reviews and consistency assessment 
programmes, coordinated efforts for dissemination and training of staff working in  
national Debt Management Offices and central banks, and increasing observance by 
courts of justice and arbitral tribumals, that can refer to the principles in their decisions, 
framing the discourse of soft law (as advocated by Matthias Goldman in the first expert 
meeting in November 2017) 
 
Indeed, as the technical note distributed by UNCTAD ahead of the second expert meeting 
clearly states: ‘There are different, but in principle complementary, methods to enhance 
the effective implementation of normative frameworks and best practice guides. These 
could be incorporated in advance into contract choice of law clauses for sovereign debt 
bonds; coordinated efforts could be stepped up to facilitate their dissemination and the 
build-up of national institutional and regulatory mechanisms for systematic 
implementation; and adjudicative bodies – domestic courts or arbitral tribunals – could 
take such guidelines into consideration in their own actions and decision-making’.64 
 
                                                        
60 UNCTAD, ‘Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing’, 10 January 
2012, available at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2012misc1_en.pdf. 
61 G20, ‘Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing’, March 2017. 
62  United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 69/319’, 10 September 2015, available at 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/804641/files/A_RES_69_319-EN.pdf. 
63  UNCTAD, ‘Financing for development: debt and debt sustainability and interrelated systemic 
issues’,  supra, 11. 
64 Id., 11. 
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It is worth recalling the ‘constitutional’ nature of the UNCTAD principles, which ‘aim to 
promote more responsible behaviour and provide economic benefit to both sovereign 
borrowers and their lenders. They are also conceptualized in a holistic way and are thus 
meant to be applied to sovereign borrowers, developed or developing countries alike, as 
well as their lenders’.65   Because of this ‘constitutional’ or rather generic nature, we 
advocate that the principles be implemented and complemented by a set of specific rules 
(a ‘manual’) on debt documentation, debt management and debt restructuring. 
 
The UNCTAD principles try to establish a balance between to the responsibilities of 
lenders (agency, informed decisions, due authorisation, responsible credit decisions, 
project financing, international cooperation, debt restructurings) and the 
responsibilities of sovereign borrowers (agency, binding agreements, transparency, 
disclosure and publication, project financing, adequate management and monitoring, 
avoiding incidences of over-borrowing, restructuring).  Irresponsible lending is as bad 
as irresponsible borrowing in the pursuit of debt sustainability and interrelated 
systemic issues. Acting responsibly is what should characterise the relationships 
between the sovereigns-debtors and their lenders-creditors.66 
 
In the the area of debt restructuring, principle 7 concerning the lenders, and principle 
15 concerning the sovereign borrowers are of particular relevance in the understanding 
of what it means to act responsibly. According to Principle 7: ‘In circumstances where a 
sovereign is manifestly unable to service its debts, all lenders have a duty to behave in 
good faith and with cooperative spirit to reach a consensual rearrangement of those 
obligations. Creditors should seek a speedy and orderly resolution to the problem’.67  Its 
rationale is based on the grounds that currently an internationally binding sovereign 
debt restructuring is missing. Therefore, a sovereign in distress is left only with the 
possibility to approach its creditors trying to find a workable solution to restructure its 
debt. In such a situation, by definition, the position of the sovereign debtor is weak. This 
is why the principle recalls the lenders’ duty to act in good faith, by making efforts to 
find a mutually-satisfactory solution. 
 
Principle 15 states that ‘if a restructuring of sovereign debt obligations becomes 
unavoidable, it should be undertaken promptly, efficiently and fairly’. 68  It mainly 
                                                        
65 UNCTAD, ‘Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing’, 10 January 
2012, 4, available at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2012misc1_en.pdf. 
66  See Bodo Ellmers, ‘The evolving nature of developing country debt and solutions for change’, 
European Network on Debt and Development, July 2016, 22.  
67  UNCTAD, ‘Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing’, supra, 
Principle 7. 
68 Id., Principle 15. 
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requires the sovereign that finds itself in financial troubles to immediately inform its 
creditors and to quickly start working out a restructuring arrangement. A prompt 
resolution to the problem is in the interests of all stakeholders.  
 
Following the decision adopted in July 2016 in Kenya to set up an ‘Intergovernmental 
Group of Experts on Financing for Development’, Member States agreed terms of 
reference for this Group of Experts in April 2017, and in November 2017 its first session 
took place in Geneva. The wider purpose of this Intergovernmental Group of Experts on 
Financing for Development (IGEFfD) is to provide an expert forum for discussion and 
deliberations on the issues, concerns and challenges raised in the Addis Ababa Action 
Agenda (AAAA).  
 
The IGE FfD brings together experts in development finance from UNCTAD member 
States, as well as officials and invited experts from other organisations, academia and 
civil society. The main objective of the IGE FfD is to produce agreed policy 
recommendations on chosen topics, based on expert discussions and contributions. 
These recommendations are presented to UNCTAD’s governing body, the Trade and 
Development Report, for consideration and endorsement. Pursuant to Resolution 
A/RES/72/204 of the UN General Assembly and in accordance with the Agreed Policy 
Recommendation of its first session, UNCTAD is requested to present the outcome of the 
work of the IGE FfD as a regular input to the UN ECOSOC Forum on Financing for 
Development Follow-up and Review in New York. 
 
In a similar vein, the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing aim at 
enhancing the ‘access to sound financing for development while ensuring that sovereign 
debt remains on a sustainable path by fostering information-sharing and cooperation 
among borrowers, creditors and international financial institutions, as well as learning 
through capacity building’.69 
 
Such guidelines are divided in five categories, such as: 1) adequate financing for 
sustainable development, 2) information-sharing and transparency, 3) consistency of 
financial support, 4) coordination of stakeholders and 5) promotion of contractual and 
new financial instruments and minimising litigation issues to strengthen resilience. 
 
All these principles play an important role in the prevention and effective resolution of 
sovereign debt problems. Debt sustainability is a fundamental long term policy 
                                                        
69 G20, ‘Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing’, March 2017. 
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objective, one that should prevail above opportunistic behaviour for short term gains.70 
 
With specific focus on sovereign debt restructuring, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted its resolution 69/319 on 10 September 2015. 71  Such resolution 
contains nine basic principles to be observed in a sovereign debt restructuring 
procedure, namely, the right to sovereign debt restructuring, good faith, transparency, 
impartiality, equitable treatment, sovereign immunity, legitimacy, sustainability and 
principle of majority restructuring.72 
 
In particular, the UN resolution clearly stresses that the sovereign country’s right to 
design its macroeconomic policy, including restructuring its sovereign debt, should not 
be frustrated or impeded by any abusive measures. But still, restructuring has to be seen 
as the last resort and, at the same time, outset creditors’ rights have to be preserved.73 
The use of good faith by both the sovereign debtor and all its creditors is specifically 
recalled and, from a practical perspective, this should entail the engagement of all the 
parties involved in constructive restructuring workout negotiations. The parties should 
pursue the aim of a prompt and durable re-establishment of debt sustainability and debt 
servicing.74  
 
Obviously, the restructuring process has to be done in a transparent way allowing to 
enhance the accountability of the actors concerned. 75  The process should be 
characterised by impartiality. To be impartial, the process needs that all institutions and 
actors involved act independently and ‘refrain from exercising any undue influence over 
other stakeholders or engaging in actions that would give rise to conflicts of interest or 
corruption or both’.76 
 
Sovereigns have ‘the duty to refrain from arbitrarily discriminating among creditors, 
unless a different treatment is justified under the law, is reasonable, and is correlated to 
the characteristics of the credit, guaranteeing inter-creditor equality, discussed among 
                                                        
70 In a similar vein, Bodo Ellmers, supra, 24, argues that ‘an effective ex-post snactioning mechanism 
is therefore necessary to ensure that debt found non-compliant with responsible lending and 
borrowing principles is not being repaid. In other words, illegitimate debt must be repudiated by the 
debtor, and eventually cancelled’.  
71  United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 69/319’, 10 September 2015, available at 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/804641/files/A_RES_69_319-EN.pdf. 
72 It is worth noting that the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 69/319 has been 
adopted with 136 votes in favour, 6 votes against and 41 abstentions. 
73 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Resolution 69/319’, 10 September 2015, Principle 1, available 
at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/804641/files/A_RES_69_319-EN.pdf. 
74 Id. Principle 2. 
75 Id. Principle 3. 
76 Id. Principle 4. 
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all creditors. Creditors have the right to receive the same proportionate treatment in 
accordance with their credit and its characteristics. No creditors or creditor groups 
should be excluded ex ante from the sovereign debt restructuring process’.77 (However, 
the IMF should maintain its preferred creditor status, as no other institutions has the 
lender of last resort role for countries that the IMF performs.) 
 
‘Sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and execution regarding sovereign debt 
restructurings is a right of States before foreign domestic courts and exceptions should 
be restrictively interpreted’.78 
 
‘Legitimacy entails that the establishment of institutions and the operations related to 
sovereign debt restructuring workouts respect requirements of inclusiveness and the 
rule of law, at all levels. The terms and conditions of the original contracts should remain 
valid until such time as they are modified by a restructuring agreement’.79 
 
The debt restructuring should be completed in a timely and efficient manner and lead to 
a stable debt situation, ‘preserving the outset creditors’ rights while promoting 
sustained and inclusive economic growth and sustainable development, minimizing 
economic and social costs, warranting the stability of the international financial system 
and respecting human rights’.80 
 
‘States should be encouraged to include collective action clauses in their sovereign debt 
to be issued’. This is because ‘majority restructuring implies that sovereign debt 
restructuring agreements that are approved by a qualified majority of the creditors are 
not to be affected, jeopardized or otherwise impeded by a non-representative minority 
of creditors’.81 
 
Such a resolution provides a complete set of principles that can help make the 
negotiations between sovereigns and borrowers both fair and effective. Its background 
is represented by the guidance developed by UNCTAD in its ‘Sovereign Debt Workouts: 
Going Forward – Road Map and Guide’ published back in 2015.82 This work, in turn, 
‘appeals to five general legal principles – legitimacy, impartiality, transparency, good 
faith and sustainability – that provide an interpretative legal framework for a step-by-
                                                        
77 Id. Principle 5. 
78 Id. Principle 6. 
79 Id. Principle 7. 
80 Id. Principle 8. 
81 Id. Principle 9. 
82  UNCTAD, Financing for development: debt and debt sustainability and interrelated systemic 
issues, supra, 14. 
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step guide to a fairer and more efficient sovereign debt workout procedure, covering all 
stages from the decision to restructure to preparing negotiations, the negotiations 
themselves and post-restructuring issues’.83 
 
In line with soft-law making some have proposed a model-law approach to sovereign 
debt restructuring.84 It is argued that it would be sufficient if either the UK or New York 
(or both) adopted a sovereign debt restructuring legal framework as their domestic 
law.85 This is based on the consideration that the vast majority of sovereign bonds are 
regulated under either New York law or English law. Therefore, the enactment by one of 
these two jurisdictions of a bunch of rules allowing the efficient and effective 
restructuring of defaulting sovereign debt would be enough to reach the goal of having 
in place an efficient procedure without the need of adopting an international treaty.86 
The success of this proposal depends on the willingness of the UK and New York to pass 
a domestic law providing specific rules on how to restructure defaulting sovereign 
bonds.  
 
6. Soft law rules and the role of debt management offices  
 
Public debt management, according to the IMF, ‘is the process of establishing and 
executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt in order to raise the required 
amount of funding at the lowest possible cost over the medium to long run, consistent 
with a prudent degree of risk’.87 
 
Typically, governments set up debt management offices. Their primary function is to 
regularly deal with the main debt stakeholders and produce investor-friendly reports 
with debt statistics and other relevant information. The importance of these aspects is 
clearly underlined even by the UNCTAD, that has argued that ‘close attention should be 
paid to capacity-building and investment in the area of debt data quality and 
transparency’.88 And the main reason for this rests on the assumption that ‘improved 
debt data availability and quality is indispensable to the design of appropriate debt 
sustainability policies, whether at the national or international levels, particularly given 
the growing complexity of debt instruments and the need to strengthen operational risk 
                                                        
83 Id., 14. 
84 Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘A model-law approach to restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt’, CIGI 
Policy Brief, No. 64, August 2015, updated as of June 2017, 1. 
85 Id., 2. 
86 Id., 3. 
87  IMF, ‘Revised Guidelines for Public Debt Management’, Policy Paper, 1 April 2014, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pp/ppindex.aspx. 
88  UNCTAD, ‘Financing for development: debt and debt sustainability and interrelated systemic 
issues’, supra, 12. 
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management capacities’.89  
 
In such context, the IMF has pointed out that ‘the allocation of responsibilities among 
the ministry of finance, the central bank, or a separate debt management agency, for debt 
management policy advice and for undertaking primary debt issues, secondary market 
arrangements, depository facilities, and clearing and settlement arrangements for trade 
in government securities should be publicly disclosed’.90 
 
One of the main practical obstacles to putting in place effective sovereign debt 
restructuring practices is the fact that developing countries often lack sophisticated and 
skilled debt management offices able to workout an efficient solution. They are meant to 
negotiate a workable solution with their creditors, who are mostly global financial 
institutions, such as international banks and investment funds, that in turn can rely on 
an ‘army’ of lawyers and financial advisors generously paid to take care of their own 
interests.  The disparity in terms of resources between the counterparties is clear, as 
recognised by the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing, and is also very 
difficult to be eliminated. Indeed, for a country that has to restructure its own debt is 
never easy to make up a team of knowledgeable advisors willing to work to safeguard 
its interests in the restructuring procedure with its international creditors. This is why 
the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing stress the relevance of the 
‘Provision of the necessary technical assistance to debtor countries, directly or through 
the international institutions in order to enhance their debt management capacities, 
while ensuring recipient countries take ownership over building their debt management 
capacities’.91 
 
We endorse in this paper the issuance under the auspices of UNCTAD of a set of specific 
and technical standards on how to negotiate sovereign bonds and how to carry out a 
debt restructuring process. A deep level of specificity could indeed make less relevant 
the disparity of skills and technical knowledge between the counterparties on the 
grounds that the procedure is somehow guided by these standards and therefore very 
little room is left to the discretion of the parties. 
                                                        
89 Id., 12. 
90  IMF, ‘Revised Guidelines for Public Debt Management’, supra. 
91  G20, ‘Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing’, March 2017, also stating that ‘This 
specifically covers the ability to staff and train debt management offices, and to ensure their 
familiarity with the different forms of sovereign borrowing, as well as the costs and opportunities 
attached to them. G20 countries support the Debt Management Facility (DMF) of the IMF and the 
World Bank and the Debt Management and Financial Analysis System (DMFAS) program of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the ongoing work aimed at 
strengthening the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) of the IMF and the World Bank as a shared 
reference by all potential lenders in their dealings with a borrower’. 
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As usual when it comes to soft law principles, the success would rest on the willingness 
of the parties involved to make themselves voluntarily subject to such rules. 
Nevertheless, the support of international institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank 
and the United Nations as well as the involvement of regional players can help in this 
effort of capacity building via the adoption of a set of specific and technical standards on 
the way to perform such restructuring procedure. 
 
7. Debt Sustainability Assessments (DSAs) 
 
A different way to make sovereign debt restructuring effective and, at the same time, 
sensitive to the public interests at stake is the so-called ‘incremental approach’ 
advocated by Matthias Goldmann and Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky.92 Such approach should 
complement the way in which, currently, sovereign debt restructuring is performed, 
through the application of a number of general principles, the most significant of which 
is the principle of sovereign debt sustainability. In so doing, such principles should be 
able to remedy the shortcomings affecting sovereign debt restructuring procedures.93 
This approach is based on the assumption that debt sustainability is now regarded as a 
principle of international public law that, in turn, embeds two important underlying 
public interests, such as economic development and growth, on one side, and protection 
of human rights, on the other side.94 
 
With the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and the Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative, in particular, debt sustainability has been recognized in the context of 
multilateral debt, thereby leading to a significant policy change.95 In the same vein, the 
Paris Club 96  has further extended the possibility of debt relief, mainly through the 
                                                        
92  Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and Matthias Goldmann, ‘An incremental approach to sovereign debt 
restructuring: sovereign debt sustainability as a principle of public international law’, (2016) 41, The 
Yale Journal of International Law Online, 13. 
93 Id., 15. 
94 Id., 21. 
95  See https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm and 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,contentMDK:2063475
3~menuPK:4876270~pagePK:64166689~piPK:64166646~theSitePK:469043,00.html. 
96 See www.clubdeparis.org, where the Club is defined as ‘an informal group of official creditors 
whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced 
by debtor countries. As debtor countries undertake reforms to stabilize and restore their 
macroeconomic and financial situation, Paris Club creditors provide an appropriate debt treatment. 
Paris Club creditors provide debt treatments to debtor countries in the form of rescheduling, which 
is debt relief by postponement or, in the case of concessional rescheduling, reduction in debt service 
obligations during a defined period (flow treatment) or as of a set date (stock treatment). The origin 
of the Paris Club dates back to 1956 when Argentina agreed to meet its public creditors in Paris. Since 
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introduction of the Evian terms in 2003.97 These measures lie on the grounds that debt 
sustainability is a precondition for economic development and growth.98 Such a change 
of perspective has finally led to reconsidering debt sustainability as a global public 
matter in international law.99 
 
The international recognition of debt sustainability as a primary goal to achieve in the 
context of debt restructuring has also found the support of both the IMF100 and the 
World Bank.101 In particular, the IMF has developed a formal framework for conducting 
public and external debt sustainability analyses (DSAs)102  as a tool to better detect, 
prevent, and resolve potential crises. This framework became operational in 2002.103 
 
‘The objective of the framework is threefold, namely: 1) to assess the current debt 
situation, its maturity structure, whether it has fixed or floating rates, whether it is 
indexed, and by whom it is held; 2) to identify vulnerabilities in the debt structure or the 
policy framework far enough in advance so that policy corrections can be introduced 
                                                        
then, the Paris Club has reached 433 agreements with 90 different debtor countries. Since 1956, the 
debt treated in the framework of Paris Club agreements amounts to $ 583 billion.’ 
97 Martin Weiss, Cong. Research Serv, RS21482, ‘The Paris Club and international debt relief’ (2013), 
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21482.pdf. 
98  Barry Herman, José Antonio Ocampo & Shari Spiegel, ‘Introduction: The Case for a New 
International Reform Effort’, in Overcoming Developing Country Debt Crises 18 (Barry Herman, José 
Antonio Ocampo & Shari Spiegel eds., 2010) 
99 Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and Matthias Goldmann, supra, 23. 
100 International Monetary Fund, ‘Assessing Sustainability’, IMF Policy Paper 4 (May 28, 2002) where 
debt sustainability is defined as ‘a situation in which a borrower is expected to be able to continue 
servicing its debts without an unrealistically large future correction to the balance of income and 
expenditure’. 
101 International Monetary Fund & International Development Association, ‘Debt Sustainability in 
Low-Income Countries—Proposal for an Operational Framework and Policy Implications’, (Staff 
Paper, 2004), 7, where debt sustainability is defined as ‘the condition that this debt can be serviced 
without resort to exceptional financing or a major future correction in the balance of income and 
expenditure’. 
102 In a DSA a judgment is made about a member’s debt-to-GDP ratio. It is deemed unsustainable if 
such ratio is likely to continue to rise in the medium term, no matter what adjustment measures are 
introduced and no matter how much financing is provided by the Fund. The Fund’s approach to debt 
sustainability analysis differentiate between market-access countries, that typically have significant 
access to international capital markets, and low-income countries, which meet their external 
financings needs mostly through concessional resources. The assessments of public and external 
debt sustainability are conducted in the context of both IMF program design and reviews, and Article 
IV surveillance. The framework for public debt sustainability analysis was reformed in 2011 and 
guidance to staff on the implementation of the new framework was introduced in May 2013. See, 
International Monetary Fund, ‘Staff Guidance Note for Public Debt Sustainability Analysis in Market-
Access Countries’, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/050913.pdf, May 2013. The 
paper underlined the need for further improvements of the Fund’s DSA Framework in order to make 
sharper judgments with respect to debt sustainability and ensure that debt restructuring is timely 
and sufficient in those cases where it is clearly warranted. 
103  IMF, ‘Debt sustainability analysis’, 28 July 2017, available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa. 
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before payment difficulties arise; 3) in cases where such difficulties have emerged, or 
are about to emerge, to examine the impact of alternative debt-stabilizing policy 
paths’.104 ‘The framework consists of two complementary components: the analysis of 
the sustainability of total public debt and that of total external debt. Each component 
includes a baseline scenario, based on a set of macroeconomic projections that articulate 
the government’s intended policies, with the main assumptions and parameters clearly 
laid out; and a series of sensitivity tests applied to the baseline scenario, providing a 
probabilistic upper bound for the debt dynamics under various assumptions regarding 
policy variables, macroeconomic developments, and financing costs’.105 
 
DSAs results ‘must be assessed against relevant country-specific circumstances, 
including the particular features of a given country's debt as well as its policy track 
record and its policy space’.106 ‘Thus, two types of frameworks have been designed: 
those for market-access countries and those tailored for low-income countries. In both 
cases, the frameworks have been regularly refined with a view to—among other 
elements—bringing a greater discipline to the analysis and responding to the changing 
economic and financial environment’.107 
 
In other words, the DSA is meant to ascertain whether a country has the capacity to grow 
out of its debt. 108 
 
From a general viewpoint, the United Nations General Assembly in its Resolution 
69/319 has argued that ‘Sustainability implies that sovereign debt restructuring 
workouts are completed in a timely and efficient manner and lead to a stable debt 
situation in the debtor State, preserving at the outset creditors’ rights while promoting 
sustained and inclusive economic growth and sustainable development, minimizing 
economic and social costs, warranting the stability of the international financial system 
and respecting human rights.’109  Particularly significant is the focus that the United 
Nations General Assembly has placed on the respect of human rights. 
 
Sovereign debt sustainability is today widely recognized in international legal practice, 
on the grounds that it guides the policies of all major multilateral institutions dealing 
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108 Sean Hagan, ‘Debt Restructuring and Economic Recovery’ in Rosa M Lastra and Lee Buchheit 
(eds), Sovereign Debt Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 359-385.   
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with sovereign debt. 110  Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean ‘that private 
interests of creditors can no longer play a role in debt restructurings’.111 Rather, they 
have ‘to be balanced against the public interests reflected in sovereign debt 
sustainability’.112 
 
The real challenge, however, is that courts around the world faced with holdout litigation 
have given relatively ‘little consideration to defences raised by debtor states that 
invoked sovereign debt sustainability as a goal’.113   Holdout creditors have kept on 
pursuing their own interests despite the multilateral efforts to relieve heavily indebted 
poor countries of their external debt burden. 114  From a practical perspective, it is 
claimed the lawsuits brought by holdout creditors have ‘significantly eroded the 
(limited) fiscal space created by debt relief initiatives for resources to alleviate poverty 
and foster economic development in these countries’.115 
  
In some jurisdictions, law courts have recognised the interests ‘reflected in the principle 
of debt sustainability, by granting immunity to debt repudiation aimed at safeguarding 
the basic human rights of citizens in the debtor states’.116 
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111 Id., 26. 
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Notwithstanding this recognition, in general the adequate protection of the broader 
policy considerations of sovereign debtors in debt restructurings is hampered by the fact 
that both parties (creditors and debtors) still rely on national courts of justice applying 
national law for the resolution of sovereign debt problems. The existential dilemma in 
sovereign debt restructuring is, indeed, the one between the sanctity of contract and 
broader policy considerations (e.g. poverty alleviation, sustainability, human rights).  
 
In the words of Lee Buchheit:  
 
To say that sovereigns should be accountable in municipal courts for their debt 
contracts, however, is not to say that municipal courts are an appropriate forum for 
administering a sovereign debt crisis.  Judges, powerful as they may be within the 
four walls of their own courtrooms, are ill-equipped and ill-positioned to decide how 
the discomfort of a financial crisis should be apportioned among the citizens of the 
debtor country and the various classes of its creditors.  Judges can only hand down 
judgments saying that, as a matter of law, the sovereign is bound to pay. They 
cannot prescribe the nature or the degree of the sacrifices that the sovereign would 
need to impose on its other stakeholders in order to make those payments or satisfy 
those judgments.(…) [W]e have thus established a framework that makes 
sovereigns accountable to the judiciary for the performance of their sovereign debt 
contracts even though everyone recognizes that the judiciary is wholly irrelevant in 
the face of a large sovereign debt problem (…).117 
 
Since unconditional respect for the sanctity of contract contributes to the success of the 
US and the UK as attractive business jurisdiction, they might not be willing to adopt a 
perspective that favours ‘distributive justice’ over ‘procedural justice’. National courts 
and national law are not designed to deal with broader policy distributive issues. 
 
Policy considerations fall into the legal category of public interests that, over time, 
defaulting sovereigns have often invoked in the lawsuits against their creditors. ‘Public 
interest defences had considerably high success rates in the 1980s and even more so in 
the 1990s. However, these rates have significantly decreased since the 2000s’.118  The 
current retreat from internationalism is a challenge to advance in the direction of giving 
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due consideration to the broader policy impact and human rights implications of 
sovereign debt workouts.119   
 
A legislative solution (hard law) can of course give momentum to soft law initiatives. The 
United Kingdom and Belgium have adopted ‘anti-vulture’ legislation. 120  Such a 
legislation is mainly aimed at preventing ‘claims against heavily indebted poor countries 
that exceed the amount that a holdout creditor would have received had he accepted the 
restructuring’.121 
 
Sovereign debt sustainability is not just a private matter between the sovereign and its 
creditors, but rather a global public interest concerning the international community as 
a whole and, as such, it should be increasingly considered by the Courts of Justice 
adjudicating on these issues, even within the contractual dimension of the creditor-
debtor relationship. 
 
Though soft law rules are not binding and enforceable, they could acquire more legal 
strength if States chose to unilaterally adhere to them. Besides that, law courts could 
decide to implement such principles in interpreting contractual provisions anyway. In 
civil law jurisdictions, for example, general clauses, such as good faith, might lead to the 
application of principles to substantiate their meaning. In the same vein, in common law 
jurisdictions, comity or equity might provide similar outcomes. 
 
To make such an approach even more effective, we would need a debt workout 
institution aimed at facilitating the application of such principles via specific 
recommendations and technical assistance. Such an institution would not necessarily 
need a treaty legal basis to be set up.122  Indeed, UNCTAD could play a role in this regard. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The UNCTAD Principles on Sovereign Lending and Borrowing and other soft law 
standards aimed at debt sustainability can play an important role in filling the legal 
vacuum that exists in the absence of an international convention on matters of sovereign 
debt.  
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The top-down soft principles agreed by UNCTAD together a set of specific technical rules 
(a ‘manual’) can complement the existing contractual regime (standardised clauses such 
as CACs, an example of bottom-up soft law) to create greater predictability in the context 
of debt restructuring and debt sustainability. UNCTAD could also monitor how member 
countries observe the provisions of such soft law rules. 
 
Soft law can act as an ‘equalizer’ in the negotiations between debtors and creditors. 
UNCTAD can play a central role in a concerted effort by international organisations, such 
as the IMF, World Bank and regional development banks, working together with national 
Debt Management Offices and central banks, in the adoption and implementation of soft 
law principles to promote responsible sovereign lending and borrowing. Courts of 
Justice can also promote the observance of these soft law principles.  
 
One can envisage a level of convergence in the area of sovereign debt similar to the 
convergence achieved by central banks in the area of capital regulation through the 
adoption of the soft law standards issued by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.  What started as soft law is now hard law. 
 
